杨恕:纳扎尔巴耶夫的权力与成功之路

日期: 2020-09-07 来源: 互联网 点击: ...
   

《纳扎尔巴耶夫的权力与成功之路》

杨恕

 

原文出处:Yang Shu, “Nazarbayev: The Road to Power and Success”, China International Strategy Review, Vol.2, 2020, pp.120–137. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-020-00046-8.

作者简介:杨恕,兰州大学中亚研究所所长、兰州大学政治与国际关系学院荣休教授。

 

Abstract: Former Kazakhstani president Nazarbayev started the construction of a new state quite smoothly due to the smooth transition of state power after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the social and economic foundation Kazakhstan inherited from it. He used instruments such as elections and referendums to successfully weaken opposition parties and expand presidential power. In addition, he moved the state capital and redrew the country’s administrative divisions, developing and consolidating the demographic majority of Kazakhs at the national and local levels. Nazarbayev emphasized the cultural and traditional foundation of Kazakhstan’s power politics and developed the idea of “grassland democracy”. Upholding the secularization of the country, he valued Kazakhstan’s special characteristics and rejected the interference of Western democracy and Islamism, achieved rapid social and economic development in Kazakhstan, significantly improved people’s wellbeing, and developed stable relations with other countries.

 

Introduction

   On March 19, 2019, President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Äbishuly Nazarbayev announced his resignation, and Speaker Kassym-Jomart Tokayev took over as acting president. On June 20, Tokayev was elected as President of Kazakhstan. The smooth power transfer does not mean Nazarbayev is no longer at the apex of Kazakhstan power, as he still serves as Chairman of the Security Council of Kazakhstan and chairman of the ruling Nur Otan party, continuing to play an important role across many aspects of Kazakhstan. It would be helpful in the following paragraphs to give a short review of his years in power after he stepped down as the president more than a year ago.

   Nazarbayev was the last president among the former union republics of the Soviet Union to leave office. His departure seemed somewhat abrupt, but analysis of power transfer processes in Central Asia and some other former union republics suggests that his approach followed these countries’ power transfer model: as long as elites successfully completed the transfer arrangement internally, it did not matter when the arrangement was made public. Nazarbayev’s “semi” power transfer was also a new, and perhaps more stable, approach. After handing over some of his power, Nazarbayev can still legally intervene if something goes wrong, and can also mediate among government institutions when needed. A few years ago, I argued that there are four models of power transfer in Central Asia (Yang 2017). It seems that there is another one, i.e., handing over some power as the first step and then handing over all remaining power as the second step.

   Nazarbayev experience as the state leader of Kazakhstan began during the Soviet era. Nazarbayev became Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 1984, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (QKP) in June 1989, and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh Socialist Republic in 1990. In 1990, he began to serve as a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee. Mikhail Gorbachev considered him for the post of Vice President and Premier of the Soviet Union. Though Nazarbayev ultimately was not appointed to either of these positions, this demonstrates that Nazarbayev’s capability as an emerging leader was largely recognized by senior Soviet leadership. From serving as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan to stepping down as the country’s president, Nazarbayev spent 29 years and 8 months as the top leader of Kazakhstan, the longest serving one among post-Soviet leaders.

   Kazakhstan covers an area of 2,724,900 square kilometers, ranking 9th in the world. It enjoys rich natural resources, especially oil, gas, and metal minerals. During the Soviet period, its economy occupied a significant part in the entire Soviet Union. It built a relatively well-established industrial system with machinery manufacturing, energy, mining, and metallurgy as its pillars, and enjoyed advanced agriculture and animal husbandry as well as a developed transportation system. The following data shed light on Kazakhstan’s economy at the end of the Soviet era. Due to its sharp economic decline in 1990 and 1991 before the collapse of the Soviet Union, its statistics from the Soviet Union’s last demographic survey in 1989 are cited here. Kazakhstan’s GDP accounted for 6.8% of that of the Soviet Union, second only to Russia and Ukraine’s GDPs, while its population accounted for only 5.8% of that of the Soviet Union (16,536,000 of Kazakhstan, compared to 286,731,000 of the Soviet Union).

   In addition to a strong national economic foundation, Kazakhstan also boasted a comprehensive education and scientific research system. In 1991, there were 55 universities and colleges in Kazakhstan, with 779 per 1000 employed people receiving higher or secondary education (comparing 760 per 1000 in USSR). These indicators were even better than those of some developed countries. Although the proportions of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians among the population who got well education were comparatively higher, it is undeniable that Kazakhs also received good education. Due to its vigorous efforts in developing education, Kazakhstan during the Soviet era cultivated a team of professional management and technical cadres that covered all areas of national development (including nuclear technology and aerospace technology). Its well-educated citizens were a huge asset and laid a good foundation for its independence. Before independence, Kazakhstan’s urbanization rate had reached 57.1%, which indicates that its economic and social development had reached a very high level.

   Generally speaking, Kazakhstan inherited from the Soviet Union a good foundation for the founding of an independent sovereign state, which, in addition to its generous endowment of natural resources endowment, jointly formed the basis for its new state building process.

Peaceful Transfer of State Power

   Nazarbayev started to serve as president during the Soviet era. The peaceful disintegration of the Soviet Union and the quiet ending of its socialist system enabled the newly independent country of Kazakhstan to peacefully acquire state power, and Nazarbayev took over as president of the new country in a smooth transfer without any objections. It must be stressed that this process of peaceful transfer of power across the Soviet Union was of great significance to Kazakhstan (as well as to other republics of the Soviet Union), but it did not receive enough academic attention.

   It should be noted that the Soviet Union disintegrated amid demands from the whole of society for human rights and freedom. The question on the March 17, 1991 referendum vote on the future of the Union was: Do you consider necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics in which the rights and freedom of an individual of any ethnicity will be fully guaranteed? Among the nine participating republics that took part (other republics also had participants), an average of 76.4% voters responded “Yes”. In Kazakhstan, the proportion was 94.1%. What should be noted here is that referendum’s given purpose for preserving the Soviet Union was twofold, i.e., “as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics” and “the rights and freedom of an individual of any ethnicity will be guaranteed”. The socialist or Soviet system was not mentioned, though the full name of the Union was “the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics”. However, if we consider the referendum question in the broader context of Gorbachev’s “glasnost” policy reforms and the Western democratic thought that was in wide circulation in Soviet society at the time, we can see that voting “yes” did not mean agreeing to preserve the original socialist Soviet Union, but rather to retaining a democratic federation. The subsequent establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was largely an embodiment of the result of this referendum. The view that the result of the referendum reflected the Soviet people’s wish to preserve the socialist system is baseless, and it cannot explain the rapid failure of the State Committee on the State of Emergency during the 1991 August Coup a few months later or the decision by all member republics to establish non-socialist systems. Perhaps some voters wanted to preserve both the Soviet Union and the socialist system, but the socialist system at that time was already essentially different from the socialist system before Gorbachev’s reforms.

   As a matter of fact, many people now still equate the disintegration of the Soviet Union with the collapse of its socialist system, which is obviously improper. These two events happened simultaneously, but they were different in nature. Theoretically, there were another two possible results after the referendum: first, all or some of the union republics could have chosen to preserve their socialist systems after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, resulting in the existence of multiple independent socialist countries; second, after its collapse, the Soviet socialist system could have been replaced by a federal state with a capitalist system. Since the Soviet Union was managed and bound together by the CPSU, which had basically lost its power before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, neither of these two scenarios occurred.

   The result of the referendum and the series of subsequent events showed that what the public wanted to preserve was a strong country rather than the socialist system. On May 5, 2005, Vladimir Putin said in an interview with German media, “I think you’ve thrown the baby out with the bathwater – that’s the problem. Liberation from dictatorship should not necessarily be accompanied by the collapse of the state… People in Russia say that those who do not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union have no heart, and those that do regret it have no brain. We do not regret this, we simply state the fact and know that we need to look ahead, not backwards” (RIA Novosti 2005). Just days after the August Coup in 1991, Nazarbayev announced his withdrawal from the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee on August 23 and resigned as First Secretary of the QKP on August 28. On September 7, the QKP Emergency Congress decided to dissolve the party. On August 24, Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary of the CPSU and suggested that the CPSU be dissolved. On August 29, an emergency session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR enacted a recommendation to suspend the activities of the CPSU throughout the Soviet Union. On December 17, Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin jointly declared in the Kremlin the CPSU an illegal organization and rejected Marxism–Leninism and the socialist system altogether. A few days later, the Soviet Union’s national flag was lowered from the Kremlin, signaling the end of an era.

   The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of its socialist system opened the door to independence for the union republics and relieved them of the important task of ideology selection when establishing new countries. These countries gained independence through evolution rather than revolution. Under such preconditions, establishing a national legal system, developing a market economy, ensuring people’s wellbeing, promoting national security, and maintaining social stability became CIS countries’ primary tasks, as well as the basis of their national authority and legitimacy.

   When Kazakhstan became an independent sovereign state, power was smoothly transferred to the new regime and its institutions, and the country’s leadership did not lose power with the loss of the Communist Party’s ruling status. Kazakhstan was the last union republic to withdraw from the Soviet Union. Former union republics that had already declared independence, especially Russia, provided Kazakhstan with a model for national construction, including presidential government, parliamentary democracy, market economy, secularization, and the elimination of socialist ideology and the power of the Communist Party. Nazarbayev inherited the legacy of the Soviet Union and introduced a model of national construction unprecedented in the history of Kazakhstan. It was in this context that he consolidated his power and developed his country.

Relocating the Capital and Redrawing Administrative Divisions

   When it became independent, Kazakhstan had a serious demographic problem, as the population of Kazakhs—its main ethnic group—accounted for less than half of the total population. For a multi-ethnic nation state, this was a problem that could not afford to be ignored. According to 1989 data, the total population of Kazakhstan was 16,536,000, of which Kazakhs accounted for 6.54 million (39.7%) and Russians 6.22 million (37.8%). There was only a difference of 1.9% between the two. In addition, Kazakhs were not as well-educated as Russians. In many large and medium-sized cities across the country, the population of Russians was bigger than that of Kazakhs. Russians even took up more than half of the population in the three regions of northern Kazakhstan, namely, Pavlodar, Northern Kazakhstan, and Kostanay. The emergence in these states of demands for accession into Russia or autonomy, though not strong, was even more worrying.

   Faced with these situations, the Kazakhstan government had to take immediate action. As early as before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the government of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, upon Nazarbayev’s proposal, passed its Regulations on the Resettlement of Ethnic Kazakhs from Abroad to the Republic of Kazakhstan, which began the history of Kazakhs abroad returning to their ancestral home. In 1992, the Kazakhstan government issued its Immigration Law, which enabled Kazakhs from all over the world, regardless of their country of residence or citizenship, to return to Kazakhstan unconditionally, acquire Kazakhstan citizenship, and receive government assistance for settlement costs and employment as long as they could provide evidence of their Kazakh ethnicity. This law is also referred to as the “Kazakh homecoming” policy. After the promulgation of this law, many Kazakhs—some inspired by the country’s newly acquired independence—returned to Kazakhstan. Statistics show that from 1991 to July 1, 2019, about 1,046,000 Kazakhs returned to Kazakhstan and acquired citizenship (Fergana News 2019). Though this is not a big number, the number of Kazakhs abroad is not large, and many of them have already become accustomed to life overseas. Furthermore, newly independent Kazakhstan did not provide an appealing environment or attractive employment and living conditions.

   The Kazakhstan government also sought to change the country’s regional demographic structure by relocating its capital and changing its administrative divisions. In July 1994, based on an initiative put forward by Nazarbayev, the Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan passed a resolution to relocate the capital from Almaty to Akmola (renamed Astana in May 1998 and Nur Sultan in 2019). The capital was officially relocated in December 1997. There has been much speculation about the reasons for the relocation. The official account is that because Kazakhstan covers a vast area, it is not convenient to govern the country from the Almaty region, which is located in the southeast. In addition, because Almaty sits on a seismic belt, it is likely to experience earthquakes on a relatively frequent basis. Almaty also suffers from poor atmospheric circulation and serious air pollution in the winter (Almaty is in an intermontane basin and suffers from poor air mobility).

   These reasons are valid and do not include the motive of changing the capital’s demography. However, heavy psychological pressure was hidden behind the decision to relocate the country’s capital. In 1989, Almaty had a population of 1,071,200, of which 616,000 were Russians (57.4%) and 255,000 were Kazakhs (23.8%). The Kazakhs were not pleased with these numbers and decided to do something to change them. In fact, nationalist sentiment among Kazakhs surged after independence. Although the government did not enact any discriminatory policies, a large number of Russians, those living in large and medium-sized cities in particular, left Kazakhstan as a result of the nationalist atmosphere in the country. Consequently, by 2017, among Almaty’s population of 1,751,000, the number of Russians was down to 468,900 (26.8%), while the number of Kazakhs rose to 1,031,000 (58.9%) (Bitrix.almatyeco.gov.kz  2019). Although Almaty is no longer the capital of Kazakhstan, it remains the largest city and the economic, cultural, and financial center of the country. Establishing a Kazakh majority there is undoubtedly of great significance in many aspects.

   Moving the capital to Astana helped establish a Kazakh majority in the new capital. According to census data, Astana’s 1981 population of 281,300 was comprised of 49,800 Kazakhs (17.7%) and 152,000 Russians (54.1%), and its 1999 population of 313,900 was comprised of 133,600 Kazakhs (41.8%) and 129,500 Russians (40.5%). By 2017, the population had reached 1,007,000, with the proportion of Russians falling to 15.3%, and that of Kazakhs rising to 75.5% (Savchuk 2017). Astana’s location in the north of Kazakhstan also helped change the ethnic structure in the region.

   In addition to relocating the capital, the Kazakh government redrew its administrative divisions. It believed that a Kazakh majority should be established at not only the national level, but also local levels. While the government prepared for the relocation of the national capital, it also made significant adjustments to the country’s regional divisions from April to May 1997, reshuffling the original 19 states into 14 new states. Some of the aforementioned Russian-majority states were revoked or merged into other states. As a result, after the measure, no state in Kazakhstan has a majority Russian population. However, several states still have a high proportion of Russians, such as East Kazakhstan, where Russians account for 37.1% (2016). Russians still take up a big share in the populations of some large and medium-sized cities.

   Due to the increase in its Kazakh population and the adjustment of its administrative divisions, Kazakhstan’s demographic structure has changed remarkably: first, Kazakhs account for the majority of the country’s population; second, they also account for the majority of the populations of first-level administrative divisions (states and municipalities). Nazarbayev has clearly achieved his goal of establishing Kazakh majorities at the national and state levels. As discussed above, as the Kazakhstan government took the above measures, a large number of Russians, including many scientists, educators, managerial staff, and even high-level cadres, left Kazakhstan due to the rise of nationalism, a worsening economic situation, employment difficulties, and falling living standards in the country. It also catalyzed the change in Kazakhstan’s demography.

   There are historical reasons for Kazakhstan’s large population of Russians (as well as Ukrainians and Belarusians) and the high proportion of Russians in its total population. After Tsarist Russia conquered Kazakhstan, Russian immigration to the country never stopped. The country experienced several apexes of Russian immigration during the nineteenth century, early twentieth century, 1930s, Great Patriotic War, and Nikita Khrushchev’s land reclamation movement. As a result, aside from Russia, the proportion of Russians in Kazakhstan was the highest among the union republics, and Kazakhstan’s Russian population was second only to that of Ukraine. Kazakhstan’s demographic structure at the time of independence was obviously not conducive to the stability of the country at both the national and local levels. For a newly independent nation state, it is necessary to have a demographic majority of its main ethnic group to build and maintain a national identity, because the ethnic identity of the main ethnic group is highly consistent with the national identity, especially in historic and cultural respects.

   Many countries in the contemporary world have relocated their capitals, and more have rearranged their first-level administrative divisions, but Kazakhstan appears to be the only one, at least among the new republics established after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, that managed to carry out both simultaneously. Kazakhstan and Russia share a 6846-kilom border, the longest land border in the world. A large proportion of Russians in Kazakhstan live in the northern region bordering Russia. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, several non-state actors unrecognized by the international community, such as South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria, have emerged in the border areas between Russia and the former union republics of the Soviet Union (Yang and Yin 2015). The 2014 crisis in Ukraine and the ongoing civil war in Eastern Ukraine demonstrates the significance of establishing a demographic majority of main ethnic groups.

   As a matter of fact, the “majority” theory and policy were not invented by Nazarbayev, but by Russia. At the end of the nineteenth century, during the age of Tsarist Russia, the theory of “unreliable regions” (geografiya neblagonadezhnosti) was proposed (Livejournal 2007). The theory held that residents in border areas conquered by the Russian Empire could be categorized into “reliable residents” and “unreliable residents”. Slavs were considered reliable residents, while non-Slavs in conquered areas were considered unreliable residents. For the sake of security, according to the theory, Slavs should migrate to these areas to change their ethnic ratios and ensure that their proportion of Slavs amount to more than 50%. Only by doing so could they make sure these areas were safe for the country. We have no idea whether Kazakhstan copied the practices of Tsarist Russia.

   It should be noted that although the relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia after the former’s independence cannot be compared with their relationship during the age of Tsarist Russia, and although national relations, ethnic relations, and regional and international landscapes have all changed tremendously, there are some similarities in the concerns on national security between the two countries. Kazakhstan’s measures strengthened the national and regional majorities of its main ethnic group, prevented possible conflicts with Russia, and helped foster the development of stable and equal cooperative relations with Russia. These measures with far-reaching significance have caused limited dissatisfaction on the Russian side.

   Nazarbayev also spoke highly of and stepped up efforts to develop relations with Russia. For example, in an interview with TASS on March 27, 1994, he said: “Russia is our neighbor, since history began, as people often say, it is given by God. We have lived in good-neighborliness, friendship and mutual understanding for generations. Our children will continue to do so. We have established very close relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan, which has become a model for state-to-state relations. We believe in and abide by this principle, because it is in the fundamental interests of Kazakhstan. I believe it is also the case with Russia… The bonds of brotherly friendship that have spanned centuries connect Kazakhstan and Russia, and the key factors that make it strong are the commonalities and spirit of the economic, historical and cultural traditions… Therefore, any attempt by anyone at any time to distance our two peoples will not succeed, even though some irresponsible politicians have done this and continue to do so ”(Ansar.Ru. 2011).

   He made similar statements many times. Nazarbayev believes that relations with Russia are the core of Kazakhstan’s foreign relations. During his tenure, he repeatedly emphasized the closeness and importance of Kazakhstan–Russia relations and continuously strengthened relations with Russia. Kazakhstan supported Russia on many major domestic and foreign issues. For instance, on the issues of the Soviet Union’s great purge and great famine, Kazakhstan did not share the view—held by some of the former union republics—that it was genocide conducted by the Russians against other nations. Kazakhstan, like Russia, designated May 9 as Victory Day. In 2019, as a very special courtesy, Nazarbayev was the only foreign leader invited to Russia’s military parade on the anniversary of its victory in the Great Patriotic War. Kazakhstan joined Russia-led regional organizations, such as the CIS, the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Eurasian Economic Union. The Russian language is ubiquitous across Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan did not condemn Russia on the Crimea issue. All these positions and behaviors reflect the special relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan. Since there have already been many discussions on and evaluations of the diverse and balanced foreign policy of Kazakhstan, this paper simply emphasizes that Nazarbayev made a good balance between the Russian factor and other factors in both domestic and foreign affairs.

Parliament and Opposition Parties

   Kazakhstan established a presidential system at the very beginning of its independence. Its presidential system has generally gone through a process of “decentralization-centralization-decentralization”, and the president and the parliament have been competing for power for several years. In the early days of independence, Kazakhstan was committed to establishing a Western-style democratic government and actively advancing reform of its political system. However, its checks and balances did not work very well due to the remaining influence of the Soviet political system. In 1993, Kazakhstan adopted its first constitution, in which it stipulated that its parliament—the country’s legislative body—would still be called the Supreme Soviet.Footnote2 The first constitution gave the legislative and judicial bodies great power to effectively balance and control the executive branch led by the president. The constitutional system established the basic framework of Kazakhstan’s democratic politics, but also further intensified conflict between the president and the parliament. In March 1995, Nazarbayev dissolved the parliament on the grounds that the parliamentary election violated the constitution, which enabled the transfer of the power from the parliament to the president, enhanced the power of the president, and formed a “strong president” political system. In 1995, the second constitution of Kazakhstan formally established the presidential system, consolidating and further expanding the power of the president. Subsequent amendments to the constitution not only added to the power of the president, but also lifted many restrictions on the president. The presidential elections and constitutional amendments are discussed in greater detail later in this paper.

   The parliament’s 2017 amendment to Kazakhstan’s constitution is different from previous amendments that consolidated the power of the president. The constitutional amendment adopted in 2017 returned some presidential power to the parliament and the government and strengthened the parliament’s supervision over the government. The amendment was adopted on the grounds that it would help strengthen checks and balances and improve efficiency. But I believe that the goal of this amendment was to prepare for the handover of presidential power. When Nazarbayev resigned, he did not want his successor to have as much power as he did, so he demanded that the parliament constrain presidential power. The amendment was clearly of great significance to his transfer of power.

   While strengthening the presidential system, Nazarbayev also sought to gain more support in the parliament and weaken opposition parties. In 1999, Nazarbayev reformed Kazakhstan’s political party system. By merging the People's Union of Kazakhstan Unity and the Liberal Movement of Kazakhstan, he established Nur Otan, the biggest political party and the largest pro-presidential party in the country. In addition, Nazarbayev facilitated the creation of Kazakhstan’s second pro-presidential party, the Civic Party of Kazakhstan, which was the second largest party in the parliament. As the third largest pro-government party, the Federation of Trade Unions of Kazakhstan also participated in the 1999 parliamentary election. The three major parties occupied most of the seats in the parliament, and the remaining seats were largely won by pro-government non-party personages. In the 2004 election, Nur Otan won 42 seats, becoming the majority party in the parliament for the first time, and the remaining seats were won by two pro-government parties, namely, Asar,Footnote3 a party led by Nazarbayev’s daughter, and a voting bloc mainly composed of the Civic Party of Kazakhstan (Golosov 2018, 5). Between 2004 and 2007, all pro-government parties merged into Nur Otan, which has been led by Nazarbayev himself since 2007. Furthermore, with the adoption of a proportional representation system, a political party can only compete for parliamentary seats if it wins a minimum of 7% of the vote. This has enabled Nur Otan to monopolize almost all the seats in the parliament Table 1.

   Since Kazakhstan’s independence, several opposition figures have emerged, but none of them have had any major impact on the political development of the country. For instance, Akezhan Magzhanovich Kazhegeldin served as Prime Minister from 1994 to 1997. In 1998, Kazhegeldin announced the establishment of the Kazakh Republican People’s Party and decided to participate in the 1999 presidential election. However, the government later declared his candidacy invalid. He was convicted of participating in unapproved public gatherings and eventually went into exile (Junisbai and Junisbai 2005, 378). The West has continuously criticized Kazakhstan for this. Nevertheless, neither of the two opposition parties established by Kazhegeldin, i.e., the People’s Party and the Forum of Democratic Forces, have had any significant impact on the political development of Kazakhstan Table 2.

   The above information shows that Nazarbayev’s party occupied the vast majority of seats in the parliament and that several other parties in the parliament were not opposition parties. In addition, the opposition parties were very weak: they did not have seats in the parliament, had little social and financial support, and their influential leaders lived abroad and lacked support from strong external forces. The absence of opposition parties in the parliament means that there has been no direct and open supervision over or opposition to the government. This structural distribution of political power demonstrates that Nazarbayev has realized his centralization of power and achieved the support of the parliament and the public.

Election: From President to National Leader

   As a matter of fact, Nazarbayev has continually led Kazakhstan since he became First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan on June 22, 1989. Under Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan held five presidential elections in 1991, 1999, 2005, 2011, and 2015. Among them, the elections in 1999, 2011 and 2015 were early elections.

   On April 24, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic passed a resolution to establish the presidency and elected Nazarbayev as president in a parliamentary election. On December 1, 1991, in the first national election, Nazarbayev, the only candidate, was elected the president of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. He won 98.78% of the vote. The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic changed its name to the Republic of Kazakhstan on December 10 and declared independence on December 16. It serves as an example of a country electing a president prior to declaring independence.

   On April 29, 1995, Kazakhstan held a referendum on the extension of Nazarbayev’s presidential term to December 1, 2000, which won 95.46% of the vote. Four months later, on August 30, 1995, it passed a new constitution that stipulated 5-year presidential terms. The new constitution also stipulated that the president should be a citizen born in Kazakhstan, between 35 and 65 years of age (Nazarbayev was 55 years at the time), have mastery of the national language (Kazakh), and have lived in Kazakhstan for at least 15 years. In addition, it stated that the president can be reelected, but should not serve more than two terms. These stipulations were not tailored for any specific individual. However, on October 7, 1998, Kazakhstan’s parliament made 19 amendments to the constitution and the President’s Decree on Kazakhstan Elections. In addition, it decided to hold an early election on January 10, 1999 on the grounds that Russia’s rapidly worsening economic and political situation may have a negative impact on Kazakhstan’s own economic and political situation. The parliament argued that to prevent the situation from getting worse, it was necessary to elect the president as soon as possible so as to maintain stability. The parliament also decided to extend the presidential term from 5 to 7 years and eliminated the age ceiling of 65 for presidential candidates and the minimum threshold of 50% voter turnout required for a valid presidential election. One can see that these amendments were made specifically to pave the way for Nazarbayev and that the reasons for the early election were not quite justifiable.

   The 1999 election was the most special of all of the country’s general elections. Only 4 of the 6 registered candidates participated in the election. The dismissed former prime minister Kazhegeldin was disqualified by the election committee on the grounds of administrative malfeasance. Western countries responded strongly to this decision. For example, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) refused to send observers in protest over the decision and made a number of accusations, including allegations that: Kazakhstan authorities illegally interfered in the election, the government-supported parties conducted dishonest activities before the election, mass media was subject to pressure from the administrative and judicial branches, the election committee supported the candidate from the party in power, and authorities made trouble for and intimidated opposition parties and candidates. Nazarbayev won 80% of the votes in that election, the lowest percentage among all his elections. No competitive candidate has emerged since then (Elimai.kz. 1999).

   In June 2000, Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Council determined that the new presidential term would count as Nazarbayev’s first term, because the previous elections had been held before the adoption of the new constitution.

   Kazakhstan’s third presidential election was held on December 4, 2005. There were 5 candidates, and Nazarbayev won 91.15% of the vote.

   On May 21, 2007, Kazakhstan again amended its constitution. The length of a presidential term was changed back to 5 years. However, at the time, a new amendment stipulated that the two-term limit on the presidency should not apply to the country’s first president, Nazarbayev. It is fair to say the amendment was made only to ensure Nazarbayev’s reelection.

   In May 2010, the parliament recognized Nazarbayev as the first President of the Republic of Kazakhstan and awarded him the title of “National Leader” (Elbası).

   On February 2, 2011, a constitutional amendment that gave the president the power to call an early election was adopted at a joint session of the two houses of parliament.

   On April 3, 2011, Kazakhstan held its fourth presidential election. Though previously scheduled for 2012, the election was moved up by Nazarbayev’s decision. He won 95.55% of the vote and was reelected as President of Kazakhstan.

   On April 26, 2015, in accordance with the President’s decision, the fifth presidential election was held early. Nazarbayev won 97.75% of the vote.

   In 2017, Kazakhstan amended its constitution once again. 26 amendments to 19 constitutional clauses were adopted. The new amendments mainly concerned the redistribution of the powers of the president, parliament, and government. Unlike previous amendments, some presidential powers concerning administrative management—such as national plan approval; government budgeting, appropriation, and review; and labor remuneration—were transferred to the parliament and the government. Presidential responsibilities and powers of coordination and arbitration across different parts of the regime, foreign affairs and national defense, national security, and constitution upholding, remained largely unchanged. This indicates that presidential power at the national strategy level did not change.

   In 2018, Kazakhstan passed its Security Council Law, which allows the Chairman of the Security Council to be a lifelong post. This meant that Nazarbayev would still wield great power after stepping down as the country’s president.

   During Nazarbayev’s nearly 30 years of rulership, Kazakhstan has held five general elections, three of which were early elections. Almost all potential obstacles, including presidential candidate requirements, required voter thresholds, presidential term limits, and the power to call an early election were determined via referendum or parliamentary decision in favor of Nazarbayev, enabling him to be reelected without any difficulty and even awarded the lifelong title of “national leader”. These practices ensured that he would preserve much of his power even after stepping down as president. Nazarbayev used the parliament, elections, and referendums as his instruments to consolidate and expand presidential power without being challenged. He successfully acquired popular support and reached the height of his personal prestige as a “national leader”, a unique figure among post-Soviet leaders.

Grassland Democracy

   In the process of expanding presidential power, establishing his party’s majority in the parliament, and restricting and excluding opposition parties, Nazarbayev has stressed the characteristics of Kazakhstan, carried on its traditional political culture, and prevented various attempts at external intervention, especially from Western forces represented by the U.S. and Islamic forces. Nazarbayev has always advocated that Kazakhstan, as a country following the principles of democracy, secularism, and market economics, should adopt laws and policies consistent with its own national conditions, rather than copy any existing model. With regard to Western democracy, he stated in very simple and straightforward fashion, “I also want U.S.-style democracy, but where in Kazakhstan would I be able to find enough Americans?” (TASS 2019) His message was clear: U.S. democracy belongs to Americans, and Kazakhstan does not need American democracy. Therefore, Kazakhstan has always resisted interventions conducted by the U.S. and other Western countries in the name of democracy and human rights and stayed vigilant by restricting the activities of Western NGOs. Although Kazakhstan maintains good relations with the U.S. and other Western countries, Nazarbayev has never relaxed in preventing Western infiltration and intervention.

   Domestic Islamic forces began to revive in Kazakhstan around the time of its independence. Various Islamic forces, including traditionalists, fundamentalists, and extremists, expanded their influence in Kazakhstan and seriously affected national construction and social life. To tackle these challenges, the Kazakhstan government enacted laws (including the Anti-Extremism Law of Kazakhstan) that prohibited religion from interfering in national politics. In addition, the government restricted the activities of foreign religious forces in Kazakhstan. For instance, Saudi Arabia donated money to build the largest mosque in Kazakhstan in Astana and sent Wahhabi clerics to preach in Kazakhstan. However, soon after, Kazakhstan stopped accepting religious donations from Saudi Arabia and demanded that Saudi clerics leave the country. For quite some time, as Islamic extremists have become more and more active worldwide, their influence in Kazakhstan has also grown. As a consequence, many Kazakhstani citizens have participated in extremist and terrorist activities and pose a severe threat to the country’s social security and stability. Many others reject traditional religious activities and even take pride in wearing Arabian robes or veils. President Nazarbayev clearly objects to such phenomena, and has stated, “I object to the burqa in principle. Young people in school, in particular, should not wear burqas or hijabs” and “It has never been part of our history. This is no such tradition in our religion. We should distinguish true religion from what is imposed on us” (Ansar.Ru. 2011). Nazarbayev also met with the country’s Islamic religious leaders many times and urged them to strive to preserve Islamic tradition, achieving quite effective results. In addition, Nazarbayev invited leaders from the world’s major religions and famous religious figures to meetings, calling for harmonious coexistence among different religions, the preservation of traditional religious authority, and opposition to any distortion of religious doctrines. These measures have stabilized Kazakhstan’s power structure, enhanced the stability and development of the country, and reinforced the authority of Nazarbayev.

   When consolidating his presidential power, Nazarbayev also tried to lay out a theoretical basis for his behavior. Almost all newly independent countries share a common characteristic: they strive to utilize and develop national culture to enhance national identity, which would be set as a national goal so as to strengthen the legitimacy of their regime. Kazakhstan is no exception. In the mid-1990s, shortly after Kazakhstan achieved independence, the term “grassland democracy” began to appear in Kazakhstani media and then gradually found its way into academic and official narratives, though it was not widely used among the general public. So far, there has not been any consistent academic definition for and official interpretation of grassland democracy, but the term has played a very important role in various of official narratives. For example, after being elected president, the first city Tokayev inspected was Turkestan, which was the capital of the Kazakh Khanate during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. While there, he said, “Grassland democracy is our inherent value; without, our nation would lose its soul” (Matritca.kz 2019). This shows the status and influence of grassland democracy in Kazakhstan.

   On the basis of existing analyses, I summarize the general meaning of grassland democracy as follows: Grassland democracy is a combination of state governance and political and philosophical concepts, including laws, institutions, customs, thoughts, and beliefs, created by Kazakhs as a nomadic group living in grasslands. It touches upon every aspect of history and culture and includes the presence of these concepts in contemporary society. I believe that the characteristics of grassland democracy are as follows:

   Legal systems based on customary law: As a historically nomadic group, Kazakhs adopted customary law as the basic foundation of state governance. When Khasim Khan was in power (1511–1523), he summarized existing customary law and took into account societal needs to formulate the first legal code in the history of Kazakhstan, i.e., Khasim Khanning Khaska zholi (the Code of Khasim). The code included basic clauses concerning property, criminal procedure, the military, and the appointment of officials. The main principles of the code were in use until the collapse of the Kazakh Khanate in 1847. During this period, after the Kazakh tribes were conquered by Tsarist Russia, the Russian government did not implement Russian law and governance in nomadic Kazakh areas for quite a long time. The Code of Tauke Khan in the early seventeenth century inherited the principles and main contents of the Code of Khasim. It should be emphasized that even after the Kazakhs converted to Islam, Islamic law did not manage to replace the contents and principles of their original legal system.

   Higher levels of local autonomy: As a nomadic group, Kazakhs lived in a vast territory with a relatively small population. For much of history, herdsmen and the officials who governed them constantly migrated. As a result, it was natural for these tribes to establish a social management system based on their nomadic lifestyles. Therefore, nomadic units of different sizes became the basic unit of state governance, which made it difficult to establish strict vertical management institutions and systems, and local autonomy—in essence, the autonomy of nomadic people—became a tradition. In addition, the lack of close links among autonomous units forced them to consult each other on major or cross-regional affairs, a practice remarkably different from that of farming areas.

   The Khan system of electing national leaders: Kazakh society was divided into seven hierarchies, with the Khan at the top. The position of Khan was not a hereditary post. Rather, candidates from a specific range were recommended, and then qualified personages met to decide who should become the next Khan.

   Limited public participation in the appointment of low-level leaders and the management of social affairs: Grassland democracy is not modern democracy, but some traces of modern democracy can be found in it. I believe that the essence of grassland democracy is elite democracy, and more research should be conducted on this idea. At the very least, Kazakhstan is the only country in Central Asia that has established a national theory based on its traditional political culture and utilized the theory as the basis for the legitimacy of its regime. The role of grassland democracy in Kazakhstan’s future social and political development should be further studied.

Conclusion

   In summary, since Kazakhstan’s independence, Nazarbayev has strengthened and consolidated presidential power through measures such as presidential elections, referendums, securing parliamentary majorities, and weakening opposition parties. All these measures have laid a foundation for him to put his ideas of governance into practice. On this basis, Nazarbayev has also placed a great deal of effort in advancing Kazakhstan’s economic development and foreign relations, managing to promote the stability and development of the country.

   Since independence, Kazakhstan has actively developed its foreign relations and won the support of the international community. So far, it has established diplomatic relations with 184 countries and joined more than 40 international organizations. It ranks among the top Central Asian countries in both these indicators. Due to these efforts, it has created a suitable environment for attracting international investment, developing economic and trade relations, and conducting cultural exchanges. Because there are already many analyses and commentaries on Kazakhstan’s multilateral and balanced foreign policy, I will not dwell on that topic. However, I will emphasize one point: the core of Kazakhstan’s balanced foreign policy is Kazakhstan–Russia relations, while China and the U.S. are Kazakhstan’s secondary partners.

   Kazakhstan’s economy has developed rapidly, since its independence due to its sound economic foundation, rapid expansion of oil exploration and production, ongoing economic reforms, and attractive investment environment. Its performance is even more impressive compared with other Central Asian countries. It is instructive to compare five Central Asian countries’ 1989 GDP and per capita GDP figures with their corresponding 2017 figures. The gap in GDP of five Central Asian countries in 1989 amounted to 6.6 times, while the gap in per capita GDP was only two times, indicating the economic development and people’s living standards of the five countries during the Soviet times were pretty close. However, in 2017, the gap in GDP rose to nearly 23 times, and the gap in per capita GDP grew to 11 times, suggesting Kazakhstan’s social and economic development and people’s living standards were significantly better than those of other Central Asian countries. Although Kazakhstan’s economic development has been quite remarkable, it should be observed that the country is still far from completing the tasks of economic reform and industrial restructuring. Insufficient investment is the main challenge. The petroleum and mining industries, especially the former, still take up a big share of Kazakhstan’s national economy, which is the basic reason why the country’s economy is greatly affected by international oil prices. To become one of the top 30 developed economies in the world, the country must accelerate its industrial restructuring. As scholars at home and abroad have already conducted a large number of studies on Kazakhstan’s economy and economic reforms, this paper will not dwell on this topic.

   In conclusion, after its independence, Kazakhstan has not experienced any serious power struggles, “color revolutions”, civil wars, or major ethnic and religious conflicts. Kazakhstan has properly handled water resource issues and border disputes with other Central Asian countries. It has enjoyed basic social stability, rapid economic growth, and extensive foreign relations, performing remarkably well in many areas. These achievements are undoubtedly due to Nazarbayev’s ability to govern the country, and in return, the country’s sustained and stable development has further enhanced his authority. For such an aspiring and ambitious politician and national leader, power is inseparable from national development. Nazarbayev has effectively balanced the two. Singapore’s founding prime minister Lee Kuan Yew described Nazarbayev as follows: “President Nazarbayev is a remarkable person among the leaders of the former union republics of the Soviet Union. The leader of Kazakhstan is tough but moderate, pragmatic, acting quickly and firmly. He is inspirational, talented and determined, a well-recognized leader among the former republics. If he continues to lead the country, Kazakhstan will embrace more opportunities for success” (Salanbekov 2017). Nazarbayev will undoubtedly go down in Kazakhstan’s history as a national leader.

 

注释略

全文可参见https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s42533-020-00046-8

 

 

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